One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability of these networks against jamming attacks, designing anti-jamming defense mechanisms is equally important. In this paper, we propose a truthful mechanism, robust against the jamming, for a dynamic stochastic cognitive radio network consisting of several selfish secondary users and a malicious user. In this model, each secondary user participates in an auction and wish to use the unjammed spectrum, and the malicious user aims at jamming a channel by corrupting the communication link. A truthful auction mechanism is designed among the secondary users. Furthermore, a zero-sum game is formulated between the set of secondary users and the malicious user. This joint problem is then cast as a randomized two-level auctions in which the first auction allocates the vacant channels, and then the second one assigns the remaining unallocated channels. Simulation results show that the distributed algorithm can achieve a performance that is close to the centralized algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum scarcity has been a major problem for the existing wireless networks which motivated researchers to investigate new intelligent paradigm to manage available spectrum. Cognitive radio (CR) has thus emerged as a promising approach to improve spectral efficiency in wireless networks. In CR networks, secondary users (SUs) may cognitively access unused spectrum that is not currently occupied by licensed users, namely primary users (PUs) under the condition that the PUs' transmission will not be interfered [1] .
Spectrum management in CR networks has been considered in many recent works such as [2] and [3] (and references therein). One important technique that enables CR-oriented spectrum allocation is to consider spectrum auction among SUs that seek to idle channels [4] . Auction theory, which is rooted in economics, offers a promising solution for intelligently allocating resources, such as power and spectrum, in CR networks. There are different approaches for implementing auction theory in wireless networks, which have been investigated in [5] . For instance, the authors in [6] find the maximization of the PUs' expected profit by proposing the leasing based spectrum allocation for SUs. The work in [7] provides a spectrum allocation based upon a double-sided auction mechanism. In this scheme, an untruthful behavior also brings suboptimal solutions. This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grants CNS-1524634 and CNS-1513697 Competition among the selfish SUs is crucial to use rare resources in the spectrum market framework [8] . The Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is commonly used in the auction games in order to provide not only the assurance of truthfulness but also the maximization of the social welfare [9] . For example, the authors in [10] and [11] proposed the incentive mechanism to encourage users to contribute truthfully their resources by forming coalitions. Moreover, selecting a proper learning task is a big challenge for designing the distributed game with incomplete information. A Bayesian nonparametric belief update scheme is suggested to solve this issue in [12] .
In CR networks, SUs are susceptible to several malicious attacks. Several anti-attack mechanisms have been proposed in existing literature [13] . In addition, a game-theoretic approach based upon the concept of secrecy capacity is proposed to model eavesdropping attacks on CR networks in [14] . One challenging issue for SUs is to have a reliable transmission when dealing with an agile malicious user which can switch between jamming and eavesdropping mode [15] . In [16] and [17] , a set of SUs is available in a stochastic medium and they select randomized channel hopping and power allocation as the defensive strategy with the proper learning algorithms. However, in a spectrum auction, users act selfishly and these defense strategies are not fully applicable.
The main contribution of this paper is to jointly consider truthful spectrum auction and the presence of a jamming attack. In this scenario, two types of users exist: selfish SUs participating the auction and a malicious jamming user that wishes to reduce the social welfare as much as possible. Our key contributions can therefore be summarized as follows:
• To model the mentioned scenario, we formulated two inter-related games: a zero-sum stochastic game between the CR network and the jammer, and an associated mechanism design among the SUs at each stage of the game. Using our proposed framework, the SUs do not show their selfishness and at the same time cooperate with each other to get higher profits against the malicious user. • In order to implement the joint games, we propose an algorithm based on zero-sum game which can extensively reduce the complexity of solving the game with an asymmetric number of actions for the players. The proposition is a basis for the work because the malicious user and the SUs are unequal in the number of actions. • Using the derived proposition, the joint game can be converted to a centralized two-level spectrum auction in which SUs send their bids to a coordinator and the coordinator confronts against the malicious user. Indeed, the main idea of the centralized two-level auction is inspired from the randomized auction which is common in combinatorial auction theory such as [18] . However, our considered scenario significantly differs from those existing works. • A decentralized method based upon the centralized twolevel auction is examined. The proposed algorithm uses the proven interesting properties of the centralized game which extremely reduces the complexity of the game with negligible performance loss compared to centralized one. • We propose a Boltzmann-Gibbs algorithm [19] [20] to estimate the unknown parameters of the decentralized scheme for each SU.Moreover, the convergence of the proposed decentralized game can be controlled by learning parameters. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II. In Section III, a centralized algorithm based on a two-level auction is described. In Section IV, we propose a truthful decentralized method in accordance with the proposed centralized auction. The simulation results are given in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION We consider a CR network consisting of M channels having a slotted-time structure indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }. Moreover, the duration of each time-slot is assumed to be T s . There are N ≥ M SUs that seek to access the vacant channels to send their data. The primary network consists of a number of PUs who have a priority to use the channels in a slottedtime manner. We consider an on-off scheme to model the channel usage, in which y j (t) = 1 and y j (t) = 0 indicate that channel j is idle and busy at time t, respectively [16] and [17] . The transition probabilities from on-to-off and off-to-on are α N 2F,j and α F 2N,j , respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that every SU can only use one channel at time t [21] . In order to avoid the conflict with the PUs transmission, each SU knows the availability of all the channels before transmitting using wideband sensing or cooperative sensing techniques [22] .
The state of channel j for SU i is assumed to be the received signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) γ ij (t), following an exponential distribution with mean of γ ij . We represent γ ij (t) by discrete states to attain a finite Markov chain. In addition, let b i (t) indicate the buffer state of user i at time t and b i (t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B max } where B max is the maximum buffer size. Thus, the state of SU i at time t is s i (t) = γ i1 (t), γ i2 (t), . . . , γ iM (t), b i (t) and the state of the stochastic game is described as follows: channel to the i-th SU is denoted by A i (t). Moreover, it is possible that no channel is assigned to the SU, i.e., A i (t) = 0.
Assume there is a malicious attacker in this scenario which attempts to interrupt the communication links of the SUs by inserting interference. The action of malicious user is to jam L channels chosen from the vacant channels. Indeed, if the malicious user jams channel j, the communication link is assumed to be disrupted at that time. We assume that the jammer knows the channel occupancy states at each stage time. For simplicity, we assume L = 1, and our approach can be extended to L > 1 case. The action of jammer, A 0 (t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }, indicates the jammed channel by the attacker. Fig. 1 shows the proposed system model and illustrates how users occupy the time-frequency resources.
Notice that the availabilities of the channels are only imposed by PUs, and hence, they are independent of the attacker's action and SUs' actions. Consequently, we can now derive the transition probability of the states as
s i (t + 1) includes information about the channels' conditions and the buffer state. The channel conditions do not depend on the SUs action. Besides, the buffer state, b i (t + 1), is affected by the jammer action, A 0 (t), the action of SU i, A i (t), and s i (t). Hence, we can express the last term of (2) as
We denote the incoming traffic of SU i at time t as f t i where f t i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ∞}. It is assumed that f t i has the Poisson distribution with the average f i [21] . Moreover, the buffer state is derived from b
Hence, we have the following expression for its transition probability
,
where (c) + = max(c, 0) and g Ai,A0 (t) indicates the transmission bit rate if channel A i (t) is selected and channel A 0 (t) is jammed. Therefore, g Ai,A0 (t) can be calculated as [23] When the i-th SU selects channel A i (t) and the jammer selects the A 0 (t)-th channel at the same time, the utility function of user i at time t is characterized as follows
In our scenario, we consider the presence of a coordinator that allocates spectrum to the SUs according to the submitted bids while maximizing the worst-case social welfare corrupted by the attacker. Hence, the interactions between the coordinator and the SUs are cast as an auction with the following elements:
• The auctionees are the SUs which use the vacant channels. • The auctioneer is the coordinator which allocates the channels to SUs. Afterwards, the auctioneer and coordinator are used interchangeably.
a ij,k indicates the proper bid for SU i to use channel j while the attacker jams channel k. • The following constraints must be satisfied at each stage of the auction:
in which z ij (t) ∈ {0, 1} shows that channel j is allocated to the i-th SU if z ij (t) = 1; and is not allocated otherwise. In order to combat the jammer, the coordinator should assign the channels to the SUs via a random strategy. In the next section, we will investigate this optimal strategy. III. PROPOSED CENTRALIZED ANTI-JAMMING SCHEME In this section, we introduce an attack-defense strategy between the SUs and the malicious user by formulating a stochastic game. According to (2) , the state of system evolves into new states via a Markov model. Hence, the Markov decision process (MDP) forms the basis of the game. In the MDP-based game, players iterate the game in order to learn the best strategy [16] . Thus, our effort is focused on designing a stochastic game in which the SUs take decisions according to their states and the history of the game.
First, we explore the game between the malicious user and the cooperative SUs. The scheme can be formulated as a twoplayer zero-sum game, in which the coordinator acts as the defender (on behalf of the SUs) and the attacker is the jammer as player 2. Here, the selfish SUs are assumed to be truthful. The case in which some of the SUs can cheat is discussed in the next section. If we have M ′ vacant channels at time t, the coordinator can select one allocation among N ! (N −M ′ )! different allocations of these vacant channels to the SUs. To enable the achievement of an optimal auction mechanism, the SUs must submit the genuine bids represented by a i,j,k ,1 ≤ j, k ≤ M ′ and 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where a i,j,k is bid of SU i when it uses channel j and the attacker jams channel k. We assume that at each stage of game, the i-th SU regards v i,j,k S(t) as the benefit derived when it uses channel j and the jammer disrupt the communication link of channel k at state S(t). Further, v i,0 S(t) is the benefit obtained by SU i when no channel is assigned to it. Hence, the benefit gained by the g-th action of the auctioneer which is comprised of vector a c (g)= i 1 (g), i 2 (g), . . . , i M ′ (g) when the jammer disrupts the k-th channel can be computed as
As stated in [24] , in order to attain an optimal auction-based resource allocation, SU i announces bid a i,j,k as
Similar to formulations established in [21] , v i,j,k S(t) and v i,0 S(t) are defined according to the stochastic game scenario.
We know that each allocation of channels is interpreted as one action of the coordinator against the attacker. That is, the g-th action can be stated as vector a c (g)= i 1 (g), i 2 (g), . . . , i M ′ (g) , where its j-th component indicates that channel j is allocated to user i j (g), where 1 ≤ i j (g) ≤ N . The bid vector of SU i for channel j is defined as (a i,j,1 , . . . , a i,j,M ′ ). The element at row g and column k of payoff matrix U = [u g,k ], representing the benefit gained from the g-th action for action k of the malicious user, is determined as
To accomplish the zero-sum game, each SU must submit its M ′2 bids to the coordinator. The number of actions and the number of N × M ′2 submitted bids in this algorithm are very high. Linear programming is a common approach to solve the problem in which the matrix game has size [25] . We define the original game based on the mentioned framework.
Definition 1: The original game refers to the zero-sum game which presumes the entire N SUs as player 1 and the malicious as player 2. This game will be used as a benchmark for being compared with our proposed game.
The above game can be solved efficiently when the SUs truthfully submit their bids. However, due the nature of selfish users, they may lie about their real bids to attain more profits. Hence, we will change the problem to an alternative game form in which the VCG-like payment can be applied to get the truthful game. We propose the two-level auction in which each SU chooses one channel as its first-priority for doing the first auction procedure and the remaining channels as its second-priority for the second one. Indeed, the coordinator first allocates the channels to the SUs based upon the firstpriority of the SUs as a part of the first procedure, and the selected users and their bids are removed for doing the second procedure. Next, the coordinator assigns the remaining channels in the second auction. We use the following definition to describe our proposed game.
Definition 2: The first and second procedures of the above are called as the first and second auctions, respectively.
In this new game, the coordinator has M ′ × . . . × M ′ N = M ′N actions because it could select M ′ channels as the first preference for each SU. In other words, each action of the coordinator is defined according to one first auction. The coordinator regards a ′ i,j as the bid of SU i for channel j instead of vector [a i,j,1 , . . . , a i,j,M ′ ] which is computed as follows,
where p 2 is the probability vector of the actions of the attacker. For an action, at the first procedure of computation, the coordinator chooses a channel among M ′ channels as a preference for each SU. Thus, the coordinator puts the related bid for the selected channel as (10) and for the other channels as 0, and then solves the auction. Similar rule must be considered for the second procedure. It means that the bid of each SU for the channel, which is selected in the first auction, is considered as 0, and the bids of the other channels is computed as in (10) . Then, the coordinator carries out these auctions for all of the actions. The auction used in the first and second auctions is done as follows,
where the channels are allocated to positive bids. Afterwards, the coordinator plays the zero-sum game consisting of the selected allocations of these two auctions for its M ′N actions. We will conclude some properties for the proposed game. First, we state the following proposition about the zero-sum game.
Proposition 1: If player 1 and player 2 participating in the zero-sum game have l 1 and l 2 actions, respectively, and l 1 > l 2 , then player 1 can select l 2 actions among the l 1 actions, and at the same time, gets the similar profit when it plays with l 1 actions. Moreover, the vectors related to these l 2 proper actions of player 1 are linear independent. The proof is given in [24] .
Proposition 1 provides a good tool to propose a lowcomplexity algorithm because the actual value of the game can be obtained by considering only M ′ actions instead of
In the following definition, the element of allocation is introduced for the proposed game.
Definition 3: We define the elements of each allocation as the set of bid vectors of the selected SUs. The whole set of elements for one allocation is designated by EL{·}. For instance, if allocation, e.g. B, dedicates channel 1 to the first SU, channel 2 to the second SU and so on, its elements, EL{B}, are Step 1. Based upon the submitted bids by the SUs, the coordinator computes the new bids according to (10) .
Step 2. All the M ′N first and second auctions in Definition 2 are constructed.
Step 3. For each of these actions, the allocations related to the first and second auctions are computed.
Step 4. Then, the vectors related to the selected allocations are found, and based on these vectors, the randomization over these actions is established in order to confront the malicious user's policies.
{ (a 1,1,1 , . . . , a 1,1,M ′ 
Furthermore, the vector of each allocation is defined as the sum of its elements.
Here, we will propose an important proposition about the proposed game. We call the zero-sum game with matrix size N ! (N −M ′ )! × M ′ as the original form of the game. Also, the proposed centralized game is denoted as the PC-game.
Proposition 2: If the attacker jams the channels by its optimal policy the value obtained by the PC-game is equal to the original game introduced in Definition 1. In other words, there exists a stable solution of the PC-game whose value is similar to that of the original game with a high probability.
The proof is given in [24] .
In the PC-game, the coordinator solves this new zero-sum game while it has M ′N actions and computes 2 × M ′N auctions. Hence, it still has a complicated structure. We will convert the algorithm to a decentralized scheme in the next section. The proposed PC-game is summarized in Table I. IV. ANTI-JAMMING DECENTRALIZED GAME BASED ON LEARNING PROCESS In the previous section, the PC-game is proposed in order to extract the anti-jamming mechanism under the condition that all SUs and the auctioneer act as one player to defeat the malicious user. However, this assumption may not hold in general since the SUs are selfish and maybe untruthful. Besides, the SUs send their M ′2 bids to the coordinator, which has the high complexity. Due to these drawbacks, this section suggests a decentralized method according to the framework provided by the PC-game.
First, pay attention to
where p * 1 and p * 2 are the optimal policies of the auctioneer and the jammer in the PC-game, respectively. Moreover, p * 1,l and U l are the l-th entry of p * 1 and the l-th row of payoff matrix U of the original game in Definition 1. If we extend each U l into its elements, we have the following formulation:
in which p * u(i,j) is equal to the probability of selection of the j-th channel for the i-th user. Every policy, which yields the same p * u(i,j) , is the optimal strategy against the attacker. This fact motivates us to move to a distributed game.
Each auction consists of M ′ allocations to the SUs. Note that from Proposition 1, we only need M ′ auctions to reach to Step 1. The SUs submit the bid based upon (10) to the coordinator. At the same time, the SUs announce their preferences over channels in order to be used in the first and second auctions.
Step 2. First auction is computed for the first preferences of the SUs. Then, allocation and payment for each SU is assigned to them by using (6) and (13) .
Step 3. Similarly, the second auction is computed for the remaining channels and the SUs. the best response against the jammer. Thus, there are at most M ′ 2 important probabilities, p * u(i,j) , at each stage of game. From this point of view, the SUs have N × M ′ variables for estimations of M ′2 important probabilities which are improved with increasing N compared to M .
In the auction, the payment of each SU is constructed from two parts. One payment part is related to the first-auction and the other part is associated with the second-auction. The computation approach of the payment for the first-auction which is similar to [21] is stated as
in which z t,opt kj is the solution of the first auction. For the second-auction, this payment can also be computed by the same procedure while the selected SUs in the first-auction and their corresponding announced bids are omitted by the coordinator. The PD-game procedure is described in Table II . We show these payments oblige the SUs to bid truthfully.
Definition 4: Assume v i , v ′ i , v −i and p t i are the real value of bid for user i, the announced value of bid for user i, the value of bids for other users and the payment assigned to user i, respectively. A mechanism is truthful in expectation when for any user i and any v −i ∈ V −i of other users, the expectation of profit attained by user i, [26] . Proposition 3: The proposed procedure for assigning payment satisfies truthfulness in the expectation criterion. The proof is given in Appendix [24] .
Note that the payment of each SU, which is dependent on all the SUs' bids, converts the profit gained by each SU into a notion of the overall value of the zero-sum game. Thus, we are trying to model the game between each SU and the attacker as the zero-sum game separately so that the separate game for each SU has some external factors related to other SUs, and each SU is effective only on a certain amount of the profit.
Note that our algorithm is distinct from work suggested in [27] in which authors employ a factored approximation of the overall Q-function based upon the linear combination of users' Q-function for the stochastic game. The proposed algorithm is not applicable in our scenario because the SUs are selfish and interested in benefiting further. Indeed, the payment structure makes the profit of SUs' network directly relevant to each individual profit due to Proposition 3. The fundamental difficulty of the PD-game is that each SU does not know enough about its related separate utility matrix. Remembering that the game will be repeated infinitely, and therefore, the SUs can learn their utilities by a certain learning scheme. We employ the scheme proposed in [19] . [24] explores the framework in detail. Actually, each SU can learn the distribution over its preference from implementing a Q-learning based method. It can be proved that Q-learning method converges to the optimal solution for only single-agent case; However, there is no such a guarantee for multi-agent cases [28] . In the next section, simulation results illustrate the convergence of the PD-game to the sub-optimal solutions. V. SIMULATION RESULTS In this section, we provide simulation results to verify the truthful anti-jamming network. We consider a cognitive radio environment with M channels, N secondary users and a malicious user. We assume that the state of signal to noise ratio for SU i and channel j, γ ij , has three values 10, 30 and 50. The probability of state transitions from these states are p(γ ij = 10|γ 1 ij = 10) = 0.4, p(γ ij = 30|γ 1 ij = 10) = 0.3, p(γ ij = 10|γ 1 ij = 30) = 0.3, p(γ ij = 30|γ 1 ij = 30) = 0.4, p(γ ij = 10|γ 1 ij = 50) = 0.3, and p(γ ij = 30|γ 1 ij = 50) = 0.3. In addition, α N 2F,j = 0.3 and α F 2N,j = 0.4 for 1 ≤ j ≤ M . We set also BER tar for all the users as 10 −5 .
A. Convergence
The convergence speed of the PC-game and the PD-game for three SUs are investigated in Fig. 2 and when M = 2. Besides, B max = 2 and f i = 0.5 for all SUs for the either case. The normalized cumulative value of SUs is used as a convergence comparison tool. As Fig. 2 reports, both algorithms converge; however, the PD-game takes longer time to reach the stable solution. The PD-game is done in the decentralized scheme with incomplete information. Therefore, it needs more times to learn the unknown parameters.
B. The effects of SU parameters on performance
In this part, the effects of the maximum allowable B max , the number of channels M , and the number of users N on the PD-game and the PC-game are evaluated. In order to have a similar benchmark for comparison of two methods, we define a new parameter θ based on (5) as,
−r i (t)/N. Fig. 5 illustrates the performance of the PC-game and the PDgame by θ for variable B max and N when M = 2. The other parameters are set alike to the previous part. In Fig. 3 , the SU with the greater B max is able to hold the data for a longer time. Thus, the increment in B max decreases θ. In other words, it can improve the performance of the system. However, increase in N has opposite impact on the θ which is result of increasing the dropping probability of data. The performance of the scenario for different average of incoming traffic f i and the numbers of SUs is shown in Fig. 4 . Rise in f i means that the average of incoming traffic increase. The outcome of the rise is to receive more traffic data at each stage of the game; as a result, the average unsent traffic θ increase. More simulation results are also provided in [24] .
VI. CONCLUSION Spectrum management among the SUs is a vital issue for CR networks, and auction theory provides a helpful tool to allocate spectrum to SUs. In this article, first, we proposed a centralized two-level auction which combined both the advantages of efficient resource assignment to SUs and acting against the malicious user. More importantly, we introduced a decentralized protocol based upon the centralized method propertiesThe decentralized scheme obliges SUs to bid truthfully because SUs can gain higher profit in expectation for the long-term interaction. Simulation studies show that both the centralized and decentralized scheme converge in the limited numbers of stages. Moreover, the performance of the proposed approach are comparable with the efficient centralized solution.
